The Arab Minority in Israel: Reconsidering the “1948 Paradigm”

ABSTRACT

The article demonstrates how, in the years since the Oslo Accords of 1993, the Arab Palestinian elites in Israel have begun to focus on reconsidering, and in fact, reconstructing the “1948 Paradigm”, the policy guidelines adopted in 1948 by the State of Israel toward the Arabs who remained within the newly established state. It surveys the historical background and the causes for the political and ideological shift, particularly following the 1993 Oslo Accords. The article examines the reconceptualization of the Arabs’ status in Israel, highlighting the emphasis on the claim to be acknowledged as a national minority and as an indigenous people. It discusses the newly introduced Nakba discourse, the call for the return of the “internal refugees”, and the demand for autonomous Arab representation. It also addresses the alternative models suggested by Palestinian Arab intellectuals and political figures to resolve the apparent contradiction between democracy and Israel’s nature as a Jewish state.

INTRODUCTION

The article seeks to illustrate how the Palestinian-Arab discourse in Israel has been increasingly focused in recent years on the reconsideration, in fact the reconstruction, of the “1948 Paradigm” characteristic of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel since the State was established in 1948. It concurrently surveys the alternative models suggested by Palestinian Arab intellectuals and political figures to resolve the seeming incompatibility in Israel’s self-definition as a Jewish and democratic state. It also
explores how this ideological shift has been expressed in the protest patterns of the Arab population.

By the “1948 Paradigm” we refer in this article to the policy guidelines adopted in 1948 by the State of Israel regarding the Arabs who remained within the boundaries of the newly established state. Israel was established, at least according to its self-perception, as an egalitarian democracy, committed to the equality of all its citizens, Jews and Arabs alike, and to the protection of human rights, including individual and collective rights of minorities. These principles were endorsed in Israel’s Proclamation of Independence. Nevertheless, while Arabs were offered full citizenship, they were simultaneously excluded from the formal definition of Israel’s national collective as the state of the Jewish people.

In practical terms, the “1948 Paradigm” was based on two contradictory, diametrically opposed considerations. One reflected the “Jewishness” of the State, and was security-oriented. It basically viewed the Arabs as a security threat and as an enemy-affiliated minority. The security orientation led to the establishment of the Military Government (1948–66), large-scale expropriation of land, and confiscation of abandoned property.2 The opposing viewpoint represented more liberal and democratic features, enhancing integration, and promoting a process that would come to be known as “Israelization”.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CAUSES FOR THE CHANGE

Historical Overview

The evolution of the Arab minority in Israel3 as a national minority can be divided into four historical phases: 1948–67 (Accommodation), 1967–93 (Palestinization), 1993–2000 (Localization), and 2000–to date (Reconstruction). This article will focus on the third and fourth phases only, i.e., the period following the conclusion of the Oslo Accords, and the developments since 2000.4

The peace process of the 1990s strongly impacted the political and ideological orientation of the Arabs in Israel. Israel’s acknowledgement of the PLO and of the Palestinians’ legitimate rights for self-determination, as well as the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, addressed many of the national demands advanced by the Arabs in Israel, particularly since the Six-Day War.5
The signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 promised a potential peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The fact that no reference was made to the Arabs in Israel in the Oslo Accords ingrained in them an acute sense of exclusion. Many within the Arab community in Israel realized that the answer to their political aspirations would not be fulfilled through the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity. A swing to the political right in Jewish politics in the 2000s was marked by numerous anti-Arab bills (discussed in detail below), deepening the Arabs’ sense of alienation. These developments compelled particular Arab intellectuals and public figures to urgently focus on their own status within Israel and to direct their resources inward in a process that was named “the localization of the national struggle” of the Arab citizens of Israel.6

The reality of a universally recognized Jewish state of Israel, they argued, granting pronounced privileges to the Jewish majority, created an intentional process of exclusion and inherent discrimination against its Arab citizens. Because socio-economic gaps between Jews and Arabs widened over the years, despite repeated commitments by Israeli governments to enhance Jewish-Arab equality, declarations never moved beyond rhetoric to produce policies that would actually reduce the gap between the two communities.7

The transition to localization symbolized a new orientation that might be understood as the “reopening of the 1948 files”.8 This orientation included the following elements: reconceptualization of the status of Arabs in Israel as an indigenous national minority with collective rights; cultivation of the historical memory of the Nakba as a foundational event for the national essence, not only of the Palestinians in the dispersion, but also for the national awareness of Arabs living in Israel; and posing the demand to permit the return to their villages by Arab citizens of Israel who remained within the borders of the State of Israel after 1948 when their villages were destroyed (known as “internal refugees” or “refugees in their homeland”).

Political-ideological discourse in Arab society in this period thus focused on what Arabs in Israel perceived as an inherent incompatibility between Israel’s nature as a Jewish state, and its definition as a liberal democracy committed to the equality of all its citizens. Consequently, debates by the Arab elites regarding the desirable nature of the State of Israel generated alternative models that would respond to and reflect the national needs of the Arab minority more equitably and resolve the intrinsic conflict between Israel’s Jewish nature and democracy.9 These and other issues will be more fully discussed in the latter part of this article.
The bloody events of October 2000, in which 13 Arab citizens were killed in a clash with the police, were a sea change in the growing mutual alienation of Arabs and Jews in Israel and led to a new phase in the development of the Arabs’ national identity, that of “the reconstruction of the national identity”. The fatal affair illustrated the explosive, sweeping combination of socio-economic strife, based on a sense of prejudice and injustice, and overflowing collective national sentiments rallied by a militant leadership. The violent confrontations between Arab demonstrators and the security forces rocked the fragile relationship between Jews and Arabs and triggered Jewish fears and concerns, on the one hand, and rising Arab frustration and rage, on the other. A 2004 study by the Israel Democracy Institute (hereafter IDI) revealed that in April 2000, 55% of Palestinians in Israel felt proud to be citizens of Israel, while after the events, in February 2001, that number had dropped to 21%.

The Future Vision Documents published between 2006 and 2007 marked yet another milestone in the developing national consciousness of Israel’s Arab community since 1948 and a landmark in the process of reexamining the “1948 Paradigm”. The documents represented the viewpoint of Arab intellectual and political elites in Israel regarding their future status and the desired nature of the State of Israel. The first document, “The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel”, called for full equality in every sphere and included plans for domestic actions to resolve the unjust conditions. The need to settle the unequal allocation of socioeconomic resources between the Jewish and Arab sectors was specifically mentioned, as was the issue of equal rights of immigration and citizenship quotas, possibly suggesting the termination of the “Law of Return”, which allows Jews to immigrate freely to Israel. The new approach was evident in six spheres: endorsing the Palestinian narrative, rejecting the Jewish nature of the state, calling for recognition as an indigenous minority with collective national rights, calling for a consociational democracy, demanding full equality, and proposing structural-institutional changes. Each of these issues will be referred to later.

Amal Jamal, in an analysis of the first three documents, noted that they all “are abundant with liberal secular ideas that aspire to universal equality irrespective of nationality, religion, race, language, ethnicity, gender, or sexual preference.” They advanced their goals employing “a civic, humanitarian discourse” and requested adoption of “principles of corrective and distributive justice in order to restore to the Palestinian minority what it has lost through physical, symbolic, and legislative violence,” but simultaneously acknowledged the Jews’ right to their own rule and statehood.
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Thus, the Future Vision documents portrayed the shift of the Arabs in Israel from passive political involvement to bold, driven political activity. While their publication revealed internal struggles of power and rivalry among the Arab leadership in Israel, it marked the first time they had cooperated and settled on a united national program.

Growing Jewish-Arab Tension

Feelings of distrust, suspicion, and fear on both sides heightened the mutual tension following the October 2000 events and the publication of the Future Vision Documents. The factors contributing to the Jews’ growing sense of animosity included the deadlock reached at that time in the negotiations with the Palestinians, an escalation in Palestinian terror acts, the rise of Hamas and suicide bombings, and the bombardment of southern Israel. A clear tilt to the right within the Jewish public was discernable, expressing loss of hope in the feasibility of a future settlement with the Palestinians. From this point on, large segments of the Jewish Israeli public considered the Arabs in Israel as part of the larger hostile Palestinian community. Arabs were increasingly conceived as an active party to the conflict, rather than passive citizens.

The Arabs, on the other hand, were intimidated by the rise of the Jewish right wing. A series of what was conceived as harsh anti-Arab legislation was introduced in the Knesset (discussed in detail below). In early 2011, Amir Makhul, Chairman of Ittijah, the Union of Arab Community-Based Associations, and a prominent Palestinian Arab activist, was sentenced to nine years having been found guilty of contact with a foreign agent conspiring to assist the enemy in war and espionage. In the same year, the head of Israel’s Security Service, Yuval Diskin, stated that “In the last year, the number of Israeli Arabs arrested following involvement in terror has doubled from 24 in 2009 to 46 in 2010.” Moreover, during that time, Israel was undergoing a constitution building and drafting process. Although Arab representatives were invited to participate, Arab intellectuals and politicians rejected the offer, feeling that their opinions would not be taken into account. This situation added to their frustration.

A number of surveys illustrated this growing tension. Thus, for example, in 2010, 39 municipal rabbis called on Jews to avoid renting or selling apartments to Arabs and called for the ostracizing of Jews who did not heed this call. A poll later that year showed that 44% of the Jewish public supported the rabbis’ initiative, while 48% opposed it. A survey by the IDI in 2010 indicated that 53% of the Jewish public wanted the state to encourage Arabs to emigrate, 55% thought that the government should be
allowed to allot more state funding to Jewish municipalities than to those of Arabs, and 54% of those polled thought that the right to vote in the Knesset should be conditioned on a loyalty oath to the state of Israel as a democratic, Jewish, and Zionist state. Furthermore, based on annually conducted field studies, Sammy Smooha concluded in 2012 that between 2003 and 2012, the attitudes of Arabs in Israel towards the state and the Jewish majority worsened, as was illustrated in the following findings:

- Only 12.2% of the Arabs considered Israeli citizenship as their most important framework of belonging; 45.2% considered “religion” as most important and 41.3% opted for Palestinian nationalism.
- 24.5% of the Arabs denied Israel’s right to exist (20.5% in 1976; 11.2% in 2003).
- 49.5% supported the establishment of a Palestinian state in all of Palestine, to replace Israel.
- 69.6% of the Arabs did not accept Israel’s right to exist as a state that retains a Jewish majority.
- 82.2% of the Arab respondents accused the Jews of [perpetuating] the Nakba.
- 70% of the Arabs said that the government treats them as second-class citizens.
- “Arab attitudes toward the Jews and the Jewish state have become more critical and militant since 1996.”

Right-Wing Legislation

Anti-Arab legislation introduced in the Knesset was a major factor in the Arabs’ increased sense of estrangement and fear and also reflected Jews’ distrust of them. In 2010, the Mossawa Center, a leading Arab advocacy group in Israel, found that in 2009, there had been 21 “discriminatory and racist” bills proposed in the Knesset—75% more than the previous year. Major pieces of this legislation include the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, the Loyalty Oath, the Nakba Bill, the Acceptance of Communities Bill, and the initiative to legislate a Basic Law: “Israel the Nation State of the Jewish People”.

In July 2003, the Knesset adopted the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, which placed restrictions on Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who marry an Israeli citizen. They were no longer entitled to citizenship or permanent or temporary residency status under a procedure known as “family reunification”. Despite numerous appeals and an agreement by
the majority of justices of the Israel Supreme Court that “The law constitutes a violation of basic rights, mainly the right to a family life,” the law was not overturned.\textsuperscript{28} Although originally approved as a temporary measure, the law is still in effect, as it has been extended thirteen times, most recently in April 2013.\textsuperscript{29}

In 2010, the Yisrael Beiteinu Party proposed an addition to the Citizenship Act, requiring non-Jews who seek Israeli citizenship to take a “loyalty oath” to the state.\textsuperscript{30} This initiative was widely interpreted as directed against the Arab citizens of the state of Israel. Due to charges of racism, PM Benjamin Netanyahu ordered Justice Minister Ya’akov Ne’eman to write a proposal requiring Jewish immigrants to take the oath as well.\textsuperscript{31} However, although the government endorsed the bill, it was rejected by the Knesset.\textsuperscript{32}

The \textit{Nakba} Bill, introduced by Yisrael Beiteinu, originally aimed to outlaw remembrance activities for the \textit{Nakba} on Israel’s Independence Day. However, due to significant public objection, the version that eventually passed in 2011 prohibited groups financed by the state from sponsoring these activities. Defending his party’s bill, MK David Rotem announced: “When we are at war against a harsh enemy, we will legislate laws that will prevent him from hurting us.”\textsuperscript{33}

The Admission Committees Law, approved by the Knesset in 2011, institutionalized the system in which admissions committees accept or reject candidates requesting to settle in areas of the Negev and Galilee with fewer than 400 families. After being challenged as discriminatory, an amendment was added forbidding committees from refusing candidates on the basis of “race, religion, nationality or physical handicap”.\textsuperscript{34}

The proposal for the Basic Law: “Israel the Nation State of the Jewish People” was first introduced by Avi Dichter of Kadima in 2011 but was later dropped because of critical, negative reactions from both Arabs and Jews. Recently resubmitted as the “Nationality Bill” in 2013 by Likud’s Yariv Levin, Bayit Yehudi’s Ayelet Shaked, and Yisrael Beiteinu’s Robert Ilatov, the law—as an editorial in \textit{Ha’aretz} put it—“effectively shatters Israel’s fragile definition as a Jewish, democratic state.”\textsuperscript{35} It included controversial proposals favoring the Jewish nature of the state, including dropping Arabic as an official language, requiring the state to devote resources specifically to the establishment of Jewish settlements in the territories, and instituting Jewish law as the source of its legal system. However, the bill was dropped in June 2013 because of a lack of consensus regarding the relative importance of equality versus Jewishness.\textsuperscript{36}
The change in self-perception on the part of the Arabs in Israel has been pronounced since the early 1990s. Arab intellectuals expressed their increasing discomfort with past profiles that described their national community as a fragmented group of individuals representing sectarian minorities. They now rejected the term “minorities” as reflecting Israel’s attempt to sow internal disunity along religio-ethnic lines—Muslim, Druze, Christian, Bedouin, and Circassian—and fracture their community. The factionalized “minorities” notion had been replaced by a sense of a national bond with distinctive linguistic, cultural, and historic features. A popular demand that came to the fore was the need to recognize the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel as a national minority (aqalliyya qaumiyya) with collective rights (see below). Amal Jamal interpreted this change as evidence that “Israeli politics of fragmentation and suppression have not succeeded completely.”

In May 2001, Azmi Bishara tabled a bill in the Knesset entitled Basic Law: The Arab Minority as a National Minority, which clearly defined the goal: “To anchor in a basic law the status of the Arab minority in Israel as a national minority entitled to collective rights and full civil equality.” Following the submission of Bishara’s bill, the Supreme Follow-up Committee, in July 2001, published a document, titled “Toward a Collective National Future for the Arab-Palestinian Public in Israel: Toward Behavior as a National Minority Based on Building our National and Representative Institutions”. It claimed that Israel’s Arab citizens constituted a national minority possessing the legitimate rights to elect their own national and representative institutions. Recognizing, like Bishara, that a call for self-determination would face opposition by the Jewish majority—because it sought to alter the very essence of the relationship with that majority—the authors of this proposal also acknowledged there would be no alternative but to enter into a struggle with the state institutions and their racist leadership in order to attain recognition for the status of a national minority.”

More recently, Honaida Ghanim similarly depicted the process of reforming the identity of the Arabs in Israel after 1967 and spoke of the minority’s liminality between the Palestinian and Israeli spheres. Collective identity, she wrote,

becomes a heterogeneous space which includes distinct historical sub-identities, and various cultural languages and voices . . . intellectuals attempt to construct an alternative reality. Here the various identity positions—Israeli
citizens, Palestinian, Arab—become combinatory constituents and not contradictory to one another. However, it should be emphasized that their combination is not automatically natural. Its success depends on national and political factors as well as on the willingness of the two sides to change.41

**INDIGENOUS PEOPLE**

In the second half of the twentieth century, a new phenomenon gained momentum in the international arena, namely, the growing demand of minority groups to be recognized as indigenous groups. After decades of unsuccessful lobbying at the UN and other global organizations, international bodies began to take notice of and engage with these groups, especially in the 1960s and 1970s.42 This new attention was fueled by several factors, including the developing self-consciousness of national minorities that had gathered momentum following the collapse of the USSR in the late 1980s, the establishment of new nation-states in the eastern bloc, and the general national awakening of national minorities elsewhere in the world. The process of decolonization around the world and a universal increase in non-governmental organizations in many fields also added to this development.43 A study initiated by the UN in 1972 regarding discrimination against indigenous groups eventually led to the foundation in 1982 of the UN’s Working Group on Indigenous Populations, a subsidiary organ to the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, and the activity in the field has continued to grow until the present.44 The UN was not alone in its recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples, as other international agencies, such as the World Bank, began to address this issue in the same period.45

In this context, the Arabs in Israel began to be exposed to and endorse the indigeneity discourse.46 Arab leaders have realized that, by calling for collective rights based on indigeneity, they are placing the Israeli government in a tight spot, as it seeks to retain the Jewish nature of the state but at the same time respect international norms to achieve acceptance in the global community.47 Arab intellectuals have been increasingly discussing the demand to recognize the status of the Arabs in Israel as an “indigenous minority”—also referred to as a “homeland minority”—a central pillar in the new self-concept of a “national minority”. Thus, for example, As’ad Ghanem and Mohanad Mustafa argued in 2011 that the political discourse of Palestinians in Israel has moved from the individual achievements level to the politics of rights on the collective level, and to the politics of identity. This discourse, they argued, is considered of utmost importance in the politics of indigenous marginalized groups within colonial entities.48
By contrast to the view of Arabs as a minority, the new perception compared Israel’s Arabs to other indigenous populations that had been conquered and dispossessed of land and culture by force. The justification for the Arab demand for collective recognition as an indigenous people was anchored in the claim of their continuous geo-historical presence in Palestine. Azmi Bishara was among the first Arab spokespersons to speak of the rights of the “original owners of the land.” Muhammad Dahla, former chair of the Adalah organization, emphasized the Arabs’ indigeneity in demanding equal rights: “We did not immigrate and request citizenship from the state of Israel. We were here all along. The color of our skin resembles the color of this earth. We are natives” [author’s emphasis]. Similarly, Khalil Nahla suggested in a recent article that the 1976 Land Day represented not only an attempt of Judaization, but also deindigenization on the part of the government.

The Bedouin community of the Negev has been particularly active in this sphere. They have mobilized this discourse as a tool in their dispute with the government over land. In 2005, they submitted a request to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations to be recognized as indigenous. “Like other indigenous people,” this document stated, “the Bedouin continued their traditional means of demarcating boundaries and dismissed the Western system of land registration and ownership.” Furthermore, they have actively protested against government actions. The chapter on Israel, which is solely dedicated to the quest of the Negev Bedouin to be recognized as an indigenous people, in the 2013 publication The Indigenous World claimed that Bedouin leaders were forbidden to enter the fifth “Conference of the Negev” in Beer-Sheva, where they were protesting the state’s discrimination against their community in the development of the Negev.

In his widely researched book, Arab Minority Nationalism in Israel: The Politics of Indigeneity, Amal Jamal examined the changing status of Israel’s Palestinian citizens from 1948 to the present day, comparing it to that of indigenous groups in other countries. In the book, he described “the gradual rise of a political discourse and collective behavior demanding corrective justice and the transformation of state identity in order to accommodate the special rights of the Arab-Palestinian minority as an indigenous homeland minority.” Oded Haklai, in his review of the book, highlighted Jamal’s statement that those indigenous peoples’ claims “go beyond cultural rights and usually seek to revitalize historical, national and political rights” (emphasis added by Haklai). Jamal explained that the indigeneity argument
has two components: “The first is the nature of the historical bond between a group of people and a specific territory that is conceived by the group as its homeland. The second is the injustice that dispossessed a group of people and its implications on the people’s rights.” Jamal further asserted that the Arab population in Israel is in fact indigenous because of “its descent from the populations that inhabited the country at the time of colonization and the establishment of the present state boundaries, as well as on account of its self-perception as such.” In his view, this “makes them entitled to all moral and legal rights granted to indigenous peoples,” although he realistically conceded that this does not mean reversing the past and what has occurred over the years.

Notwithstanding the significant expansion of the discourse of indigeneity in Israel, Jamal emphasized its relative newness and the fact that it is currently limited to a small number of Arab intellectuals and politicians. “Indigeneity is still not a common and well-known political theory among the Arab public, despite the fact that most Arabs will insist that they are the native inhabitants of Palestine when asked about it.” Nevertheless, Jamal maintained that “This new approach . . . makes clear that the Palestinian reality of pre-1948 is becoming the moral as well as the analytical basis on which the treatment of the Arab minority in Israel should take place,” and he concluded that “If the Jewish majority continues to operate as an ethnic group and to control all the state’s resources and institutions exclusively, Arab-Palestinian citizens will keep raising their indigenous identity, deconstructing Jewish hegemony.”

RECONSTRUCTING NAKBA MEMORY

One of the most impressive aspects of the “return to 1948” phenomenon is the restoration of the collective historic memory of the “Nakba”, “the catastrophe” or “the colossal loss” of Palestine in the 1948 war as conceived by the Arabs. Amal Jamal has emphasized that

Arab politics in Israel is becoming more and more about the consequences of the 1948 War and the Palestinian Nakba . . . especially concerning Palestinians’ connection and attachment to the homeland and the rights of Palestinians over the land and its material and symbolic value, dismissing the Israeli understanding that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is about the consequences of the 1967 War and the Palestinian struggle for statehood.
Jamal viewed this change as evidence that “the Arab-Palestinian community has shifted from a romantic nostalgic reaction to the catastrophic results of the Nakba to a more assertive and realistic form of patriotism.”68

Four major factors molded this renewed emphasis on the Nakba memory since the late 1990s: the emergence of a new generation of Arabs; the implications of the Oslo process; the 50th anniversary celebrations of the state of Israel; and the Arabs’ growing sense of marginality and inability to identify with the collective Jewish memory. A central motif in the reconstruction of the Nakba memory was its relevance to present day reality in that it resembled a tragedy whose consequences continue to this day.69 As Honaida Ghanim explained, “To the Palestinians, the Nakba means the loss of one’s homeland, the collapse of society and the failure of one’s national project and dream.”70 An additional motif was symbolized by a new demand for symmetry in the national narratives of the Jews and the Arabs, summed up concisely in a slogan that gained wide popularity: “Yaum istiqlalikum—yawm nakbatina” (“Your independence day—our day of catastrophe”).71

National-political activity included Nakba memorial ceremonies held on two dates—5 Iyar, the Hebrew date of Independence Day in Israel, and May 15, the date of the establishment of the state in the international calendar and the date assigned as Nakba Day. Ceremonies involved pilgrimages to the sites of abandoned or destroyed villages whose histories were recounted. These rituals first began to gain traction in 1997 with a memorial ceremony attended by thousands at the destroyed site of Ghabasiyya, under the banner: “Restore Lands to the Internal Refugees”.72

Commemorations of al-Nakba have increased significantly since the early 2000s. The 2011 Nakba Day events attest to the deep roots of the ideological transformation experienced by the political-intellectual circles of Arabs in Israel. Three themes recurred in the memorial ceremonies: the narrative of the Nakba, the displaced persons (al-muhajjarun), and the demand for return. Additionally, the percentage of Arabs who reported participation in Nakba commemoration events rose from 12.9% in 2003 to 31.1% in 2010; 71% believed that “The Jews are mainly to be responsible for the Nakba.”73

Other ways Palestinians in Israel are reviving their heritage include publication of books and monographs, weekly columns in the local press, and tours to the sites of destroyed villages.74 A new trend that has become particularly popular in recent years in mixed Jewish-Arab cities, is attempts to restore original Arabic street names, “Hebraized” after 1948.75 There is also a project to reconstruct the naming of neighborhoods and alleys in old Acre for the “preservation of Acre’s cultural and national identity”.76
Additionally, in May 2011, Ayman Awda, secretary general of the Hadash Party, suggested new “national initiatives” to commemorate the Nakba including establishment of the “Nakba Museum” and naming streets in Arab villages and towns after national heroes and leaders from Palestinian history.77

INTERNAL REFUGEES

Another significant manifestation of the trend toward reopening the “1948 files” has been the revival and amplification, from the early 1990s, of the displaced persons (al-muhajjarun) issue, or “refugees in their own homeland”.78 The term al-muhajjarun, which in Arabic literally means “those forced to leave”, refers to the Palestinians who remained in Israeli territory during the 1948 war, or who made their way back to Israel after the war, but were unable to return to their original homes and villages, which had been abandoned or destroyed during and after the fighting. In 1948 this population had numbered tens of thousands, and it was estimated to stand in 2011 at approximately 250,000.79

The idea of return was never erased from the consciousness of the “refugees in their own homeland”, although it was not expressed politically or organizationally until the start of the peace process.80 The second and third generations of the internal refugees continued marking their identity with villages that had ceased to exist.81 Likewise, Amal Jamal noted that “The historical catastrophes and deep feelings of injustice cannot be cured on the personal level and cannot be superseded on the collective level. They form a strong hidden force that bursts occasionally to the surface, influencing social and political reality, and shapes political consciousness and behavior.”82

A Countrywide Committee for the Protection of the Rights of the Displaced Persons in Israel was thus established in 1995 under the leadership of Wakim Wakim. He defined the committee’s goals as “unequivocally, a return to our villages . . . We will not agree to any other solution. We will not . . . accept compensation.”83 The committee sponsored some 30 local branches representing former residents of abandoned villages, and its major achievements include placing their issue on the political agenda of the Arabs in Israel and harnessing the support of the Arab Knesset factions,84 legally contesting the government’s claim of a security threat, initiating informal education about the issue for Arabs, and protesting Israeli policies on the global level through human rights organizations.85 Other activities
include organized visits to the sites of the abandoned villages, particularly on Israel Independence Day and on Nakba Day, and the preservation of remaining sites and ruins in the villages, especially mosques, churches, and cemeteries.86

The recent expansion of the muhajjarun discourse among the Palestinians in Israel was expressed in their escalated political activity. During the Nakba Day events of 2011, support for the concept of return to ruined Arab villages in Israel reverberated in the speeches of leading political figures and newspaper editorials. At the main rally in Kufr Kana convened under the following slogan: “Remain and Return” (Baqa’ wa-Awda), Sheikh Ra’id Salah, the leader of the more dogmatic faction of the Islamic Movement in Israel, declared, “We will not give up the right of return” (La ‘awda ‘an haqq al-‘awda).87 The Islamic Movement, the organizer of the event, conveyed a clear message: We are here to stay and our flag is the principle of return.88 MK Talab al-Sana emphasized in the 2011 ‘Awda procession that this was the “sacred right of return of the Arab public” in Israel, referred to as the “Palestinian inside” (al-Dakhil al-Filastini), to their villages.89 However, the term ‘Awda itself was vague. It could be understood as support for the right of return of the refugees outside Israel, or as support for the right of return of the “internal refugees” inside their homeland. The questions of “Whose return?” “Return to where?” were intentionally left indeterminate and blurred.90 At the 2011 rally, Sheikh Ra’id Salah also said, “All we have is one response against the blackest of these racist laws . . . The peoples, should they arise, are bound to win” (Inna al-shu’ub idha habbat, satantasir).91 Wadia’ Awawdah likewise suggested that the time has come for the Palestinians in Israel to transform the public reaction to the Nakba from mere commemoration to an action-oriented political program: “The time has arrived to start a real struggle to fix the problem of the displaced people.”92

Recent statements and writings by Arab intellectuals in Israel further demonstrate the mounting prominence of this discourse. In 2011, Honaida Ghanim emphasized the endurance of the aim of return for all Palestinians, whether in or out of Israel: “Amid the various struggles and wars, the majority of Palestinians continue to live in hope of returning home, even if that home has been reduced to a pile of dust.”93 Muhammad Kana’ana, Secretary General of the Sons of the Village Movement, wrote in May of the same year: “The return (al-Awda) constitutes a personal and collective right and obligation and no person has the right to ignore it, to give up, or to negotiate this right.”94
DELEGITIMIZATION OF “JEWISH STATE”

Israel’s Arabs see their failure to achieve equality with Israel’s Jews as a consequence of the country’s Jewish identity and the failure of its democratic values to compensate for the advantages extended to Jews. Many academicians and politicians across the entire spectrum question whether Israel’s dual identity makes the equal treatment promised in the country’s Declaration of Independence impossible to achieve.95

The publication of the Future Vision Documents in 2006 and 2007 further reflected the growing rejection of the Jewishness of the state. In the first document, Israel was conceived as “the outcome of a settlement process [the Hebrew version translates this literally as colonial action] initiated by the Zionist elite[s] in Europe and the West.” Israel is required to officially acknowledge the “historical injustice” inflicted upon the Palestinians in the country, and various events that have been erased from the official Israeli versions of the country’s history. The same document also rejected Israel’s definition as a Jewish state and its perpetuation of an inferior status for its Arab citizens. Israel is an ethnocratic rather than a democratic state, as its Jewishness places Palestinian citizens in confrontation with the very essence of their state of residence. In an ethnocracy, Arab spokesmen claimed, the state’s resources are harnessed to the interests of the predominant ethnic group, to guarantee the hegemony of the majority (also referred to by Arab speakers as a “majoritarian tyranny”) and to marginalize the minority.96

Although perceived as confrontational by some Jews, as As’ad Ghanem clarified, “This is not a demand to abolish the existence of Israel nor is it a demand for an arrangement that is different than what is currently accepted by the majority of Jews and Palestinians—two states, Israel and Palestine.”97

In the period following the publication of the Future Vision Documents, Arab Israeli intellectuals continued to criticize the idea of a Jewish state and argue for its rejection. Nadim Rouhana wrote in 2010 that “It has become clear to the Palestinians in Israel that accepting the Jewish State means being ruled without equality in their homeland and being a national group without belonging to a state or even a homeland.”98 In the same year, Talal Salman similarly asserted that “There is no Palestine apart from its Arab identity” and thus “there is no room for juristic discussion about the contradiction within the future hybrid Jewish-democratic state.”99 Raja Aghbariya further declared,
When the two-state solution becomes a totally imperialistic project, as seen in the partition plan, and Israel and the United States adopt it, we must firmly reject it outright and unequivocally. All those persons who live among us, who rejected the plan to Judaize the state, but did not think that such rejection contradicts, both in principle and in practice, recognition of Israel and legitimacy of its establishment as a state, or who sought to reduce the “struggle” to the question of equality and to the democratic regime of the Jewish state—the State of Israel—must recognize that this platform no longer suffices and cannot be implemented, given that Israel announces to them and to us: prepare yourselves for emigration!100

Ra’if Zurayq, in an article in 2010, traced the history of the delegitimization of the Jewish state, claiming that, upon the state’s establishment in 1948, it was unnecessary to specify its Jewishness. However, once the oppressive military rule had been lifted from the Arabs within the Green Line, they began to confirm their presence and identity, and Israel, facing this unexpected emergency, gradually began to revise its self-definition as a Jewish state through legal documents.101 Zurayq also warned against recognizing the Jewishness of the state of Israel—at the core of Zionist doctrine, in his view, and stipulated in Israel’s Declaration of Independence—as this was a fundamental obstacle to the development of the idea of “a state for all its citizens”.102 Mohammad Zeidan, chairman of the Supreme Follow-up Committee, further declared that Arab Israelis would not abide by certain Israeli laws, which he termed “racist”. These, he said, included the proposed law on loyalty, which stipulated the disqualification of Israeli citizenship from individuals who act against the State of Israel, and the law that declares that Israel is a Jewish state.103 However, he later explained that the struggle of the Arabs in Israel was not a struggle against the state of Israel, but a struggle for equality and for a two-state solution. He stated, “We are part of Israeli society and we are struggling to remain part of it.”104

Issam Makhoul, writing in 2009, broadened the scope of his appeal to include the global community. In his view,

Responsibility for confronting the Israeli establishment’s concepts of “the Jewish character of the state”, and “the demographic threat” does not rest with the Arab minority in Israel alone, but is the task of all proponents of democracy and opponents of the descent into fascism, Arabs and Jews alike, and the duty of all those who advocate peace around the world.105
Notably, the Islamic Movement plays a role in promoting the confrontational discourse and has recently published *The Jewishness of the State and the Palestinian Inside* (*Yahudiyyat al-Dawla wal-Dakhil al-Filastini*), a comprehensive edited volume of articles that discuss the negative implications of the “Jewish nature of the state” from the perspective of the Palestinians in Israel.\(^{106}\) In 2009, Abd Al-Hakim Mufid, a senior member of the Islamic Movement in Israel, tied the idea of the rejection of the state to the concept of return:

> Recognition of the Jewish State means closing the refugees’ file. The Palestinians cannot return to “the Jewish State” in principle, and the “the Jewish State” will not accept them . . . to approve or accept the Jewish State is to finally absolve Israel of its responsibility for the displacement of the Palestinians . . . Ultimately, the Jewish State can exist only at the expense of the Palestinians.\(^{107}\)

Thus, Mufid argued, “Palestinians and Arabs, both here and abroad, are required, in this regard in particular, firstly to reject the concept, as well as any step that contributes to its fulfillment, and, more importantly, to adhere to their own national principles.”\(^{108}\) Likewise, in an article he wrote in 2011, Sheikh Ra’id Salah equated the Jewishness of the state with colonialism and discussed the fact that some intellectuals believe that the notion of the Jewish people was invented.\(^{109}\)

In 2010, the Center for Contemporary Studies, an offshoot of the Islamic Movement, organized a forum with a number of political, religious, and social figures to discuss the issue of the Palestinians in Israel and the Jewishness of the state.\(^{110}\) ‘Abd al-Rahim ‘Anabtawi, one of the participants, emphasized the need to preserve the Arab identity in Palestine in the face of Judaization, which, in the words of Dr. Ibrahim Abu Jabir,\(^{111}\) Netanyahu’s government is attempting because of “the state’s fear of its own dissolution”.\(^{112}\) Dr. Suhail Diab likewise stressed in his lecture that the Arabs must document their history, as there are those who each day are attempting to forge it.\(^{113}\) Dr. Abu Jabir asserted:

> This forum comes in light of the right-wing government working towards stealing lands, demolishing houses, and razing lands, as is happening in the Negev, with the aim of uprooting us from our land, which is the land of our parents and ancestors who were born and lived on it and died and were buried in it, and we will die on it and never leave it.\(^{114}\)
Similarly, Mohammad Zeidan,\footnote{115} in his discussion of the Jewish efforts to erase Palestinian history and withdraw their rights, declared: “But this is our land, and we are the true owners of the land. We will not leave it. Rather, we will die on it.”\footnote{116} Dr. Abu Jabir also claimed that the Israeli government was insinuating through its talk of the Jewishness of the state that the Arabs should emigrate voluntarily.\footnote{117} The lawyer Hassan Tabaja gave a lecture regarding ethnic cleansing, saying: “This ethnic cleansing, the silent and the glaring, has several aspects, including murder and evacuation; occupying ideas and policies to Judaize the place; stealing the past, present, and future; and even stealing the identity of the land the country.”\footnote{118}

“ONE STATE SOLUTION”

Debates by the Arab elites on the nature of the State of Israel have generated alternative models that would better respond to the needs of the Arab population and more fully address the aims for equality that have thus far been denied to them. Public discourse was dominated by three models that underscore the major ideological transformation of Arabs in Israel in the 1990s in relation to their self-perception as a national minority: a state for all its citizens, autonomy, and a bi-national state.\footnote{119}

Since the late 1990s, the bi-national state idea has been notably reintroduced into the public discourse. In a controversial interview in Ha’aretz in 1998, ‘Azmi Bishara declared that “If a totally just solution is being sought, it can be realized only in the bi-national context.” While noting that the solution of two states for two peoples was not invalid, it was, in his view, only a temporary solution, and ultimately the bi-national option was inevitable. “For every Palestinian,” Bishara observed, “this land must be as Palestine in its entirety, and for every Israeli [Jew] it must be Eretz Yisrael in its entirety”—in other words, for both peoples a bi-national solution is the ultimate objective.

Nadim Rouhana also proposed a bi-national model within the borders of the Green Line. As’ad Ghanem, however, advanced his own version of bi-nationalism as a solution to the inherent inequality in the state of Israel. In a 1997 article, he proposed, rather tentatively, “a democratic state with strong bi-national components . . . granting the Palestinians in Israel the right to conduct their own cultural affairs and other matters distinctive to them independently.”\footnote{120} Later, he developed the idea of bi-nationalism more fully in an article in The Journal of Palestine Studies (Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya) in 2000; he acknowledged that
solutions aimed at developing liberal democracy in Israel, or separation, were not workable, and therefore efforts must be directed toward a bi-national alternative in the entire area of Mandatory Palestine. He set out four principles for the foundation of the bi-national form of government: 1) A broad coalition between the political representatives of the Jews and the Palestinians; 2) The right of mutual veto regarding weighty issues; 3) Proportional representation in political institutions and socioeconomic bodies; and 4) Autonomy for each group in conducting its internal affairs.

The Future Vision Documents reinforced the demand for a one-state solution. The authors of the first document, published on behalf of the National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel in 2006, called for supplanting the present regime in Israel with a “conso - cational democracy”, namely a binational state model based on full power-sharing between the two national groups in government, distribution of resources, decision-making, proportional representation, and the mutual right of veto on crucial decisions. The second document, Adalah’s draft Democratic Constitution, proposed replacing the Jewish, democratic State of Israel with a “democratic bilingual multicultural state”. The authors emphasized that the proposal emerged from a study of the constitutional and legal experiences of a number of democratic states, particularly those with significant national linguistic and indigenous minorities, and was grounded as well on international human rights covenants and declarations. The future vision of the Haifa Declaration, the third document, published by Mada al-Carmel, proposed the establishment of a democratic state founded on equality between the two national groups. This would require a change in the definition of the State of Israel from a Jewish state to a democratic one, and would entail annulling laws and citizenship based on ethnicity (namely the Law of Return), establishing Arabic and Hebrew as official languages of equal status, guaranteeing the Palestinian citizens the right of veto in all matters that concern their status and rights, and ensuring their right to cultural autonomy. “It is these principles that can guarantee our right to self-determination as a homeland minority,” the declaration concluded.

Other Arab Israeli intellectuals who have added their voices to those demanding a bi-national state include Thabet Abu-Ras, who, in 2011, called for Arab and Jewish societies to “work against the neo-apartheid regime and towards the establishment of one democratic, bi-national state”, and Amal Jamal. Jamal pointed out that “Self-determination doesn’t have to mean statehood . . . the right of the two peoples for self-determination may
have to be reconciled in a confederal or federal institutional framework, in which both peoples equally share power.” He also viewed collective rights for the Palestinians as complementary to equal citizenship, rather than as replacing it.

**RECONSIDERING REPRESENTATION**

Although Arab participation in Israeli elections had been declining for years previously, Dov Waxman identified the boycott of the February 2001 elections for prime minister as a landmark. More than 80% of Arab voters joined in a massive shunning of the polls that was backed by every Arab political party and subsequently set a new pattern of refusing to participate in elections. After a subsequent resumption in and stabilization of Arab participation, in 2006, participation dropped again. The newly established “Popular Committee for the Boycott of the Elections” dismissed participation in Knesset politics dubbing it a futile effort and a waste of time, maintaining that “the fundamental national basis” required Arabs to refrain from supporting the legitimacy of the Knesset, which represented the state “founded on the ruins of our nation”.

In the context of these developments, demands for alternative, non-Knesset representational channels, including a separate Arab parliament gained momentum. As’ad Ghanem argued that a significant boycott of Knesset elections would precipitate a search of organizational alternatives namely “The election of an Arab-Palestinian political body by means of nationwide elections, which would constitute a kind of national leadership of the Palestinians in Israel.” Echoing this stance, the Sons of the Village also claimed that the national awakening should be used “to establish an Arab parliament which will organize our masses from a national point of view, determine the [nature of the] link with the Israeli establishment, and serve as a means to prevent our masses from being dragged along in a struggle limited to the confines of the Knesset alone.” Likewise, Samah Alkhatib-Ayoub wrote in 2012 that “Democratization can be achieved through the acknowledgment of the right of the indigenous minority to preserve its identity and in the establishment of a representative body to serve as a mechanism for national pluralism much more than through its denial.”

Since the 1980s, the Higher Follow-up Committee has taken on some of the roles of a political leadership among the Arabs. Thus, some proposals for establishing a representative body have largely centered on its reform,
such as implementing direct election.\textsuperscript{139} With this approach, Muhammad Amara reasoned, the Committee “could also become a representative for the collective rights of the Arabs, and the equivalent to a ‘real Arab parliament,’ one that would constitute the most important building blocks of cultural autonomy.”\textsuperscript{140} According to Mohanad Mustafa, most of the Arab groups back this proposal, among them the (non-parliamentarian) Islamic movement, the National Democratic Alliance (hereafter NDA), and “The Sons of the Country”, while a few reject it, including the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality and some subsets of the Islamic movement in parliament.\textsuperscript{141} Ghanem similarly asserted in 2012 that the Supreme Follow-Up Committee is no longer fitting in the present time and that the Arab Israelis need to start a political project that will be based on the principles of majoritarian decisions. This would be achieved through organizing “general national elections” to choose a Supreme National Committee (Ham'a Wataniyya 'Ulya).\textsuperscript{142}

The aim of new representative bodies was also reflected in the Future Vision Documents. The first document proposed structural-institutional changes, including the establishment of self-rule (autonomy) in education, religious and cultural affairs, and the media, to guarantee the unrestricted development of the Arab minority’s specific collective identity. It also proposed the formation of an elected national representative body for the Arabs in Israel. The second document ensured power-sharing in the political system in one of two ways: by a Parliamentary Committee for Bilingual and Multicultural Affairs, half of whose members would be members of Arab parties. The committee would be able to veto any law related to symbolic, bilingual, and multicultural issues. The Knesset plenum would be able to overrule the committee decisions only by an extraordinary majority of no less than two-thirds of the members. The second model suggests that no bill can be approved by the plenum of the Knesset if 75% of Arab members voted against it.\textsuperscript{143}

Another aspect of the reopening of the 1948 files phenomenon is the expanding role of Arab NGOs in Israel. During the 1990s, in the context of the peace process, the Israeli Arabs’ changing self-identity, and their disappointment in their own political leadership, the number of Arab NGOs began to rise to fill various needs in the Arab community.\textsuperscript{144} Indeed, in the eight years since the Law of Associations\textsuperscript{145} was passed in 1980, about 1,000 Arab NGOs were registered.\textsuperscript{146} As Amal Jamal argued, “Arab civil society, as a minority society, plays a political role by empowering Arab citizenship and challenging the dominant political, material and symbolic power structure.”\textsuperscript{147}
One of the major activities of these organizations is reinforcing relations both between the Palestinians in Israel and those outside it, as well as among the various groups of Palestinians within Israel, and strengthening their common identity. As previously discussed, some NGOs undertake activities for cultural preservation, such as tours to destroyed villages. The Follow-Up Committee for Arab Education likewise teaches Arab children about their history and culture from their own viewpoint, rather than that of the Israeli government.

Further, Arab NGOs offer the minority critical social services, including health, welfare, education, religious services, and planning, that the state does not deliver. They also provide significant employment opportunities to educated Palestinians in need of work. Additionally, organizations research important issues for the Arab minority, such as the state’s land and budgetary policies, in order to present them with the knowledge they need for informed decisions or lobbying.

Another principle goal of these NGOs is to advocate and lobby on behalf of the Arabs and politically mobilize them. According to Jamal, the Future Vision Documents “mark a turning point . . . in terms of the growing involvement of Arab NGOs in determining the political agenda of the Arab community and contributing to the political mobilization of the community.” NGOs have aimed to change discriminatory government policies in a number of areas and have at times been successful. Jamal cited a number of examples, including Adalah’s participation in the legal sphere, Mossawa’s lobbying against imbalanced resource distribution, and the Al-Aqsa Society’s restoration of significant religious or historical locations.

One major subset of the NGOs is the Islamic Movement. Because it was registered under the Law of Associations in 1980, it transitioned from largely covert operations to acting within the Israeli legal system. Islamic groups in Israel sponsor a wide variety of activities and services, ranging from medical clinics and food banks to preschools and sports teams. However, its leaders disagreed regarding political participation, leading to the movement’s division in 1995.

Despite their considerable efforts, Arab NGOs have not succeeded in enacting significant democratic change within the Israeli system. Rather, as NGO activity escalated, the Israeli government increased its efforts to maintain the ethnic focus of the state, which, as Jamal put it, led to “the hollowing out of Arab citizenship.” Furthermore, they have faced such challenges as internal division and lack of organization. Nonetheless, these organizations have without a doubt made substantial contributions and achievements in addressing social concerns in Arab society.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

The question of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel cannot be detached from the wider context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The conflict is far from being resolved, and under the present predicament, it is hard to envisage an immediate, all-encompassing solution to the Arab population’s sense of exclusion due to what is being conceived as the incompatibility between Israel’s nature as a Jewish and democratic state. Thus, with regard to the national identity question, what seems to be a more feasible policy is for Israel to adopt a “conflict management” approach, rather than a “conflict resolution” one.

Concurrently, Israel should instantly focus on reducing existing tensions that pertain to the socioeconomic, educational, cultural, and religious spheres. It should also seriously consider granting collective rights such as land allocations and housing. The new discourse on rights must be equally accompanied by a commitment to civic duties, the Civil Service being one such appropriate obligation.

One need not be naïve to believe that improving the material lot of the Arab Minority would eliminate the national discontent. The socioeconomic and the national realm are inseparable. However, inseparability does not necessarily imply conditionality. While retaining its Jewish and democratic character, the state of Israel can, and should, offer its Arab citizens shared citizenship and civil equality, based on common interest and joint responsibility.

Such a policy should reinstate the “rules of the game” vis-à-vis the Arab Minority, namely, that it is unlikely for the Jewish majority to accept the Arab population’s struggle for integration, while simultaneously seeking to deconstruct the “1948 Paradigm”, and in fact delegitimize Israel as a Jewish state. Instead, a liberal government policy that is committed to eliminating acts of discrimination and exclusion and reinstating the integrative approach adopted in 1948 would strongly appeal to large sectors of the Arab public in Israel, mostly rank and file. These constituencies do not necessarily share the goal of Palestinian Arab intellectuals and political figures to dismantle the “1948 Paradigm” as the sole solution to the identity crisis. In many cases, one may assume, they are not even aware of the “indigeneity discourse”, as an example. Surveys conducted in recent years consistently demonstrate the existence of such a “silent majority”, which seeks to retain their status as Israeli citizens. See, for example, results of Sammy Smooha’s surveys indicating willingness to accept Israel’s existence as a Jewish state. The adoption of a government policy that is genuinely
striving to minimize socioeconomic gaps and offer a shared citizenship platform will provide this significant segment of the Arab public with a feasible framework of joint life.

Notes

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3. The terms “Arabs in Israel”, “Palestinians in Israel”, “Palestinian Arabs in Israel”, “Israeli Arabs”, “Arab citizens in Israel”, and “Arab minority in Israel” are used interchangeably in this article.

4. Rekhess, “Evolvement.”
5. Ibid., 11.


20. An umbrella organization for Palestinian NGOs in Israel, established in 1995.


32. Somfalvi, “Government.”


43. Idem.


46. See also Samah Alkhatib-Ayoub, “The Legal Right of the Palestinian Minority in Israel as a National Indigenous Minority to Establish a Representative Body,” Jad al 15 (2012).


53. See Seth J. Frantzman, Havatzelet Yahel, and Ruth Kark, “Contested Indigeneity: The Development of an Indigenous Discourse on the Bedouin of the Negev,


57. Jamal, Arab Minority.

58. Ibid., 6.


60. Jamal, Arab Minority, 47.

61. Idem.

62. Ibid., 49.

63. Ibid., 40.

64. Ibid., 14.


68. Ibid., 10.


77. www.aljabha.org, 5 May 2011.
78. See Areej Sabbagh Khoury and Nadim Rouhana, “A Reading of the ‘Right of Return’ from the Perspective of the Palestinians in Israel,” Institute for Palestine Studies 22.86 (2011) [Arabic].
82. Jamal, Arab Minority, 10.


102. Idem.


106. *The Jewishness of the State and the Palestinian Inside* (Umm al-Fahm, 2010) [Arabic].


108. Idem.


111. Dr. Ibrahim Abu Jabir is the director of the Center for Contemporary Studies.

112. “The Palestinian Inside Facing the Jewishness of the State.”

113. Watad, “Jewishness.”

114. “The Palestinian Inside Facing the Jewishness of the State.”

115. Mohammad Zeidan is president of the Supreme Follow-Up Committee.


117. Watad, “Jewishness.”

118. “The Palestinian Inside Facing the Jewishness of the State.”


130. Jamal, Arab Minority, 52.


146. Idem.
147. Jamal, Arab Minority, 189.
149. Payes, “Palestinian NGOs,” 83.
150. Jamal, Arab Minority, 216.
151. Ibid., 11.
154. Ibid., 6.
155. Ibid., 202.
157. Ibid.
158. Jamal, Arab Minority, 225.
159. Ibid.